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Government R&D Support for SMEs: 
Policy Effects and Improvement Measures 
By SUNGHO LEE AND JINGYEONG JO* 
Government R&D grants for SMEs have risen to three trillion Korean 
won a year, placing Korea second among OECD nations. Indeed, 
analysis results have revealed that government support has not only 
expanded corporate R&D investment and the registration of 
intellectual property rights but has also increased investment in 
tangible and human assets and marketing. However, value added, 
sales and operating profit have lacked improvement owing to an 
ineffective recipient selection system that relies solely on qualitative 
assessments by technology experts. Nevertheless, if a predictive model 
is properly applied to the system, the causal effect on value added 
could increase by more than two fold. Accordingly, it is important to 
focus on economic performance rather than technical achievements to 
develop such a model. 
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  I. Introduction 
 
n amount of 8.1 trillion won, 40 percent of the entire national annual R&D 
budget (19 ―trillion won) was allocated for economic growth including 
industrial and infrastructure development, in 2016. Among these funds, three 
trillion was earmarked for the innovation of SMEs in the form of R&D grants, 
making Korea the second largest spender in absolute amounts among OECD 
members, next to the US and ahead of Germany and Japan. Moreover, due to the 
government’s direct grants and indirect tax benefits, the yearly R&D investment of 
Korean SMEs exceeded 13 trillion won during the same year (36,026 affiliated 
research institutes). Korea also ranks fourth in total corporate R&D and second in 
SME R&D among OECD nations, as shown in Table 1.1 In particular, small firms 
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TABLE 1— INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF TOTAL CORPORATE R&D INVESTMENT AND 
GOVERNMENT-FUNDED R&D COSTS BY FIRM SIZE 
(Unit: 1 million dollar, PPP exchange rate) 
Number of 
Employees 
Korea 
(2013) 
US 
(2011) 
Japan 
(2013) 
Germany 
(2013) 
France 
(2013) 
1-49 6,033 (914) 
21,842 
(2,066) 
1,135 
(49) 
2,448 
(544) 
4,292 
(492) 
50-249 5,955 (662) 
21,996 
(1,515) 
4,620 
(99) 
4,230 
(499) 
4,881 
(261) 
SME subtotal 11,988 (1,576) 
43,838 
(3,581) 
5,755 
(148) 
6,678 
(1,043) 
9,173 
(753) 
250- 41,442 (1,384) 
250,255 
(27,730) 
117,776 
(1,162) 
62,235 
(1,272) 
28,331 
(2,281) 
Total 53,430 (2,961) 
294,092 
(31,630) 
123,531 
(1,310) 
68,914 
(2,316) 
37,503 
(3,035) 
Note: Figures in parentheses denote government-funded R&D costs. 
Source: Main Science and Technology Indicators (OECD Stat webpage). Cited from Park et al. (2016) pp.24-25. 
 
with fewer than 50 employees, including startups, were found to invest more 
actively in R&D than medium-sized firms.2 
Prior literature on the performance evaluation of R&D support projects have 
mainly focused on how support contributes to increasing corporate R&D 
investment and intellectual property (IP) rights, and the majority of outcomes have 
shown a positive relationship. However, with the exception of Oh and Kim (2017), 
very few studies have dealt with the economic gains of R&D support. Oh and Kim 
(2017) looked at growth indicators (sales, employment, assets, and liabilities), 
profitability indicators (ROA, ROE, operating margin), and R&D investments by 
firms to assess the economic gains from governmental R&D support. This study 
adds value added and various strategic assets to the list of economic indicators. 
Value added is the most comprehensive indicator, and not only knowledge capital 
such as R&D but also physical capital, human capital, and relational capital may 
contribute to the growth of value added. Indeed, with governmental R&D grants 
for SMEs reaching the three trillion won mark, this study attempts to assess the 
contribution of government support projects comprehensively along with other 
strategic assets and to seek ways to enhance the effectiveness of these sources of 
funding. 
 
II. Government R&D Support Projects for SMEs 
 
The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program is the main R&D 
support program for SMEs in the US. In 2015, the SBIR program distributed about 
$2.5 billion via eleven departments. 
 
1China has rapidly expanded R&D investment and risen to become the world’s second largest provider (no 
statistics available on SME R&D). 
2Largely due to the government’s fund of funds, Korea’s ratio of venture capital investment to GDP rose to 
0.13% in 2015, standing below that of the US (0.33%) and China (0.24%) but far higher than those of Japan, 
Germany and France (approx. 0.03%) (Park et al., 2016). 
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Edison (2010) examined 1,460 companies applying for US Department of 
Defense (DOD) SBIR funding in 2003 and found a significant causal effect of 
increased sales of recipients by $0.15 million during the following year ($0.37 
million in 2004-2006). In addition, Howell (2017) analyzed the earnings of 5,021 
companies applying for US Department of Energy (DOE) SBIR funding in 1995-
2013 and confirmed that grants awarded during Phase Ⅰ (the proof-of-concept 
stage with funds up to $0.15 million for 6-9 months) increased the average 10% 
probability of venture capital funding by +10%p and $2 million in sales by $1.3-
$1.7 million. The results also revealed that the increases were not due to the effects 
of government certification; instead, they stemmed from the effects of proof-of-
concept demonstrated via prototypes. Moreover, increases in venture capital 
funding were particularly strong among firms without patents and young startups 
less than two years old (+6%p and +14%p). On the other hand, the extensive grants 
given during Phase Ⅱ (the subsequent full-scale R&D with funds reaching $1 
million for a period of 24 months) had little economic impact. Accordingly, Howell 
(2017) concluded that rather than offering large long-term funding to a few 
medium-sized firms, it would be more effective to award small lump sums to 
numerous small-sized firms. Germany and Finland operate similar programs, 
providing small grants and research consulting services to such firms and startups 
which lack R&D experience. Most R&D support programs in advanced economies 
have transparent and convenient online management systems that accommodate 
free competition for bottom-up research designs. 
Based on the SBIR, the Korean government established the Korea Small 
Business Innovation Research (KOSBIR) program in 1998 and has steadily 
increased this budget since. Indeed, the expenditure for SME-operated government 
R&D projects reached 2,897 billion won in 2016, equivalent to 15.2% of the 
government’s total R&D investment amount and similar to the US SBIR’s total 
grant amount.3 According to the National Science and Technology Knowledge 
Information Service (NTIS) database, which includes information pertaining to the 
management of all government R&D projects, among the 30,448 R&D projects 
awarded to firms in 2010-2014, the median funding amount was 200 million won, 
while the top 20% ranged from 525 million to 54.7 billion won and the bottom 
20% accounted for less than 100 million won. In the US, Phase Ⅰ projects (about 
$0.10 million per project) outnumbered Phase Ⅱ projects by two to three fold. 
However, in Korea, nearly 80% of projects were funded at more than 100 million 
won per project, implying a strong tendency to omit the initial proof-of-concept 
stage and begin with full-fledged support. 
Governments evaluate R&D support projects in terms of patents and 
publications. Patent applications for SMEs continued to soar due to their strong 
commitment in acquiring more patents, rising from 34,547 in 2013 to 46,813 in 
2016.4 On the other hand, that number for large enterprises declined from 48,045 
to 38,800 over the same period following a shift in the evaluation focus of R&D 
divisions to the creation of economic value after it was deemed that practices such 
 
3Ministry of Science and ICT·Korea Institute of Science & Technology Evaluation and Planning, 2016 
National R&D Project Report and Analysis, 2017 (in Korean). 
4Korea Intellectual Property Office, Intellectual Property Statistics FOCUS, 2014; 2017 (in Korean). 
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as stockpiling unused patents simply to demonstrate technological prowess was a 
waste of financial (patent applications and renewal fees) and research resources. 
 
III. Comparison of Recipients and Non-recipients 
 
This study used the Korea Enterprise Data (KED) (2010-2015) to analyze the 
economic effects of government support programs. Research subjects were limited 
to incorporated enterprises with more than ten employees. The 2010-2015 financial 
―performance outcomes of a total of 212,245 firms were analyzed of which 
165,023 small-sized firms and 42,770 medium-sized firms were the main focus of 
the analysis. In this study, 70% or 21,265 cases in the NTIS were linked to our 
dataset. 
 
TABLE 2—BASIC SME STATISTICS COMPARISON 
Variable 
(Unit: 1 million won) 
Non-recipient SMEs 
(control group: 670,760) 
Recipient SMEs 
(experimental group: 18,980) 
Average Standard deviation Average 
Standard 
deviation 
Basic 
Firm age 9.10 8.26 10.72 7.80 
IPO ratio 0.13 0.33 0.36 0.48 
Ratio of venture firm 0.10 0.30 0.57 0.50 
Operating 
Performance 
Value added 1,389 19,100 3,008 5,988 
Increment (∆௧ାଶ) 195 26,400 43 9,792 
Increment (∆௧ାଷ) 330 31,200 163 10,400 
Sales 6,733 21,900 13,600 30,500 
Rate of increase (∆௧ାଶ) 0.36 2.11 0.13 1.06 
Rate of increase (∆௧ାଷ) 0.41 2.16 0.17 1.09 
Operating profit 255 2,826 559 3,105 
Increment (∆௧ାଶ) 8 3,067 -155 3,639 
Increment (∆௧ାଷ) 8 3,134 -203 3,969 
Financing 
Debt 4,030 32,100 7,820 17,400 
Rate of increase (∆௧ାଶ) 0.32 1.25 0.22 0.66 
Rate of increase (∆௧ାଷ) 0.42 1.31 0.29 0.75 
Equity 2,360 18,500 7,505 20,900 
Increment (∆௧ାଶ) 447 7,077 1,046 13,300 
Increment (∆௧ାଷ) 750 8,821 1,758 14,600 
Capabilities/ 
assets 
R&D investment 64 1,377 741 1,718 
Rate of increase (∆௧ାଶ) 0.22 4.23 -0.77 5.36 
Rate of increase (∆௧ାଷ) 0.34 4.71 -1.17 5.69 
IP rights registration 0.12 1.94 1.86 12.90 
Rate of increase (∆௧ାଶ) 0.01 0.30 0.11 0.73 
Rate of increase (∆௧ାଷ) 0.01 0.32 0.10 0.76 
Tangible assets 2,160 11,600 5,277 14,900 
Rate of increase (∆௧ାଶ) 0.41 2.06 0.24 1.19 
Rate of increase (∆௧ାଷ) 0.52 2.23 0.34 1.33 
Human capital 830 2,567 1,718 2,753 
Rate of increase (∆௧ାଶ) 0.33 1.68 0.13 0.88 
Rate of increase (∆௧ାଷ) 0.41 1.73 0.19 0.95 
Marketing investment 79 913 163 937 
Rate of increase (∆௧ାଶ) 0.20 3.84 -0.01 3.52 
Rate of increase (∆௧ାଷ) 0.25 4.13 0.01 3.74 
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Based on the financial data, this study extracted ten performance indicators 
pertaining to the following three aspects: operating performance (value added, 
sales and operating profit), financing (debt and equity) and capabilities/assets.5 
Value added is the most comprehensive indicator, as it covers all value distributed 
to various stakeholders, including employees (labor cost), shareholders (dividends), 
government (taxes and dues), creditors (interest), and firms (net profit + 
depreciation cost). Additionally, despite the significance of economies of scale in 
the past, the scalability of intangible assets has grown in importance, as shown by 
Uber and Airbnb. Thus, in terms of performance indicators for capabilities/assets, 
this study used R&D investment, IP rights registrations and marketing investment 
in conjunction with tangible assets and human capital investment.6 
Table 2 shows that recipients considerably outperformed non-recipients on 
average in terms of most indicators, specifically operations, financing and 
capabilities/assets when they receive subsidies. The differences are statistically 
significant, and the differences in the operating profit and R&D investment 
indicators widen by more than twenty times. However, there is a visible reverse in 
this trend two to three years after the reception of support, except for IP rights 
registrations. Even operating profit and R&D investment decrease.7 When large 
enterprises are included in the comparison, negative growth can also be observed in 
value added and marketing investment. 
 
IV. Estimation of the Causal Effect of Government Support 
  
Existing econometric studies usually estimate causal effects with a parametric 
model, which is created by assuming the form of the functions and distribution of 
the data. However, models based on hard-to-verify assumptions always run the risk 
of misspecifications. Matching methods (matching observations which have 
different values of the treatment variable and similar values of other covariates) are 
widely used to estimate causal effects from observed data in the absence of random 
experimental data, although the matching method cannot account for the effects of 
unobserved variables. Matching methods, as non-parametric preprocessing approaches, 
can compensate for the weaknesses of parametric models. Ho, Imai, King and 
Stuart (2007) suggest a two-step unified estimation approach which integrates a 
non-parametric matching method and the parametric regression model. The two-
step approach can accurately estimate causal effects even when only one of the two 
steps is properly specified. Hence, it is doubly robust and can also estimate the 
effects of other covariates. 
 
5The distribution of corporate performance tends to skew to the right as it is influenced by large firms. As 
such, this raw data underwent logarithmic transformation while the raw data for value added, operating profit, and 
equity were used as they were considering that many of these values were negative. 
6Based on financial statements: tangible asset data was used as tangible assets; the sum of labor-related costs, 
welfare benefits, education and training costs and stock compensation was used as a proxy variable for human 
capital investment; the sum of R&D expenditures in income statements and manufacturing cost statements and the 
increments of intangible asset development costs was used as a proxy for intellectual property investment; and the 
sum of advertising costs, sales promotion costs, entertainment expenses and overseas marketing expenses was 
used as the proxy variable for relational assets. 
7With regard to equity financing, recipients posted larger increments but smaller growth rates. 
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In this study, diverse methods were attempted in the matching phase. Propensity 
score matching (PSM) satisfies the unconfoundedness assumption 
 (1), (0) | Xi i iY Y T  by replacing multi-dimensional covariates (X)  with 
propensity scores  P(X) . PSM usually uses parametric models such as the 
logistic and probit models to convert multivariate covariates into one-dimensional 
propensity scores. The values of the closest propensity scores in the experimental 
group and the control group are then matched one-to-one with each other. 
Alternatively, the weight is given in proportion to the proximity of the propensity 
score. However, King and Nielsen (2016) suggest that alternative matching 
methods should also be tested because PSM can aggravate imbalance, inefficiency, 
model dependence and bias. Specifically, it is difficult to satisfy the conditional 
independence between the covariate and treatment variable depending on a single 
parametric model given that there is a complex decision-making system in reality. 
The lack of computing power in the past made PSM useful, but matching based on 
multi-dimensional covariates has become affordable owing to the advancements in 
computing power. 
Mahalanobis Distance Matching (MDM) is also one of the most widely used 
matching methods. PSM and MDM are equal-percent bias-reducing (EPBR) 
methods, meaning that they reduce the bias by the same rate through a linear 
combination of covariates (Kim, 2016). EPBR methods can reduce bias only when 
the dataset of covariates can be modeled using a Gaussian (normal) distribution. 
Because the distribution of real data is often not Gaussian, a matching method 
based on a linear combination may rather increase the bias. 
Iacus, King, and Porro (2009) developed the Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) 
method, which divides the covariates into coarse intervals and then precisely 
matches the same interval units. Imbalances cannot be larger than the block range 
predefined by a researcher and an improvement in the balance for one covariate 
does not affect the imbalance of the other covariates. However, CEM may leave 
many cases in the treatment group unmatched with the control group. If the interval 
of the covariate blocks is widened to increase the matching rate, imbalances will 
increase as a trade-off. 
Another alternative matching method is Genetic Matching (GM), which 
optimizes the balance of covariates using a genetic algorithm (Sekhon, 2011).8 The 
Mahalanobis distance is defined as follows: 
 
(1)     
1
21md( , ) ( ) ( )Ti j i j i jX X X X S X X
    
In equation (1), S  is the sample covariance matrix of X . If the covariate 
contains continuous variables, there is a bias that does not disappear (Abadie and 
Imbens, 2006). The GM algorithm adds a square matrix of weights W  to 
generalize the Mahalanobis metric when the Mahalanobis distance does not 
optimally approach equilibrium. The equation for the GM algorithm is as follows: 
 
8The matching package can be downloaded at CRAN.R-project.org/package=Matching. 
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(2)  
1 1 1
2 2 2d( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )T Ti j i j i jX X X X S WS X X
     
In equation (2), 
1
2S  is the Cholesky decomposition of S , and the matrix of the 
weights W  is a diagonal matrix that has zeros without diagonal elements. If the 
diagonal elements of W are 1, it becomes the Mahalanobis distance. GM uses a 
genetic algorithm to search for the optimal solution of W iteratively such that the 
maximum unbalance among the covariates of the control and experimental groups 
is minimized. 
Ho, Imai, King, and Stuart (2007) suggest that various matching methods must 
be assessed to find the most robust results. This study used as many as 17 
covariates, including the seven firm attributes of age, size, region, industry, IPO 
status, venture firm status, and affiliation status as well as ten performance 
indicators. First, the propensity score matching method allowed overlapping when 
matching the nearest cases and assigning weights in proportion to the similarity of 
the propensity scores. In the case of CEM, the block interval of the covariates was 
coarsened (widened) such that at least 70% of the firms could be matched. The GM 
computation took much more time than that needed by the other matching methods 
due to the greater computational complexity. 
Table 3 shows to what extent the mean difference between recipients and non-
recipients can be reduced using the PSM, CEM, and GM methods. All of the mean 
differences became smaller than that in the raw data. GM reduced the mean 
differences the most, by an average of 85%, and PSM reduced these values by 
about 70%. However, even if the overall average is similar, differences in 
individual pairs can still be large. A deviation from exact matching is referred to as 
an imbalance. The imbalance of the raw data was reduced the most using GM and 
then to a lesser extent by PSM and CEM. 
  
TABLE 3—COMPARISON OF MEAN DIFFERENCE AND REDUCTION RATE BY THE MATCHING METHOD 
(Unit: 1 million won; log transformation of 1,000 won) 
Covariates 
Mean Difference Reduction Rate 
Raw data PSM CEM GM PSM CEM GM 
Value added -21,499 -14,942 -1,849 -5,635 0.305 0.914 0.738 
ln (sales) -1.45277 -0.26676 -0.65236 0.05180 0.816 0.551 0.964 
Equity financing -112,292 -81,024 -5,622 -33,117 0.278 0.950 0.705 
ln (debt) -1.63607 -0.24761 -1.08969 -0.04096 0.849 0.334 0.975 
Operating profit -11,813 -9,104 -344 -4,774 0.229 0.971 0.596 
ln (tangible assets) -2.68170 -0.31424 -1.78535 -0.01798 0.883 0.334 0.993 
ln (human capital) -1.59099 -0.19074 -0.80534 -0.02787 0.880 0.494 0.982 
ln (marketing investment) -3.30725 -0.60767 -3.11299 -0.12307 0.816 0.059 0.963 
ln (R&D investment) -9.29562 -0.68442 -8.79407 -0.40304 0.926 0.054 0.957 
ln (IP rights registrations) -0.62686 -0.23760 -0.32307 -0.03511 0.621 0.485 0.944 
Firm age -2.98611 -0.64181 -1.68229 -0.37315 0.785 0.437 0.875 
Firm size -0.25449 -0.06970 -0.15041 -0.00268 0.726 0.409 0.989 
Ratio of venture firms -0.44578 -0.05481 -0.45277 -0.00028 0.877 -0.016 0.999 
Firm region -0.07900 -0.01670 -0.12711 -0.08145 0.789 -0.609 -0.031 
Industry group -0.80774 -0.13427 -0.74409 -0.02822 0.834 0.079 0.965 
IPO ratio -0.29116 -0.05620 -0.23131 0.00005 0.807 0.206 1.000 
Ratio of affiliate firms -0.01923 0.00766 -0.00158 -0.00127 0.602 0.918 0.934 
Mean     0.707 0.386 0.856 
54 KDI Journal of Economic Policy NOVEMBER 2018 
When Q-Q plots (quantile-quantile plots) were drawn for each covariate 
variable, the balance improves as the values of the experimental group and control 
group are arranged close to the 45-degree line. Figure 1 shows Q-Q plots of the sales 
 
 ln (sales) ln (IP rights registrations) 
Raw data 
  
PSM 
  
CEM 
  
GM 
  
FIGURE 1. Q-Q PLOT OF SALES AND IP RIGHTS REGISTRATIONS BY THE MATCHING METHOD 
Note: In all plots, the horizontal axis represents the value of non-recipients and the vertical axis represents value of 
recipients.  
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and IP rights registrations, which are relatively high in terms of the mean difference 
and imbalance. The matched pair values move closer to the 45-degree line than the 
raw data, and the values from GM move closest to the 45-degree line. Because the 
GM method has proved to be the best given all of the matching evaluation criteria, 
subsequent analyses will use the matched dataset derived from GM as a control 
group. 
Table 4 shows the OLS regression model using the matched dataset. The 
dependent variable is the value added change ( 2t ) after two years, and seventeen 
firm-specific attribute and performance values in the supported year are controlled 
for as independent variables. Because this analysis applied the difference-in-
differences (DID), matching method and multiple regression together, it can 
estimate the causal effect more robustly than a mere difference-in-differences 
matching method. This proves that the inferior value added growth of the recipient 
SMEs shown in Table 2 is not due to the treatment effects of government support. 
  
TABLE ―4 OLS ANALYSIS OF VALUE ADDED INCREMENT (∆௧ାଶ) 
IN THE MATCHED DATASET 
(Unit: 1,000 won) 
Variables 
(at year t) 
Matched SMEs 
Estimate Significance
R&D support treatment 38,159 0.672 
Value added -0.633 0.000** 
ln (sales) 133,147 0.002** 
Operating profit 0.287 0.000** 
Equity financing -0.026 0.000** 
ln (debt) -260,714 0.000** 
ln (tangible asset) 28,016 0.415 
ln (human capital) 495,701 0.000** 
ln (marketing investment) 12,730 0.291 
ln (R&D investment) -12,099 0.289 
ln (IP rights registrations) 344,400 0.000** 
Firm age 6,891 0.625 
Firm age (squared) 490 0.113 
Firm size (medium business) 1,940,460 0.000** 
Firm size (mid-size company) - - 
Firm size (major company) - - 
Ratio of venture firms -173,183 0.072 
IPO ratio 912,434 0.000** 
Ratio of affiliate firms 5,434,900 0.000** 
Firm region (Chungcheong) -52,145 0.706 
Firm region (Jeolla) 236,958 0.183 
Firm region (Kyungsang) 39,668 0.730 
Firm region (others) 187,213 0.488 
Industry group 2 37,908 0.728 
Industry group 3 19,271 0.874 
Year (2011) -52,310 0.693 
Year (2012) 119,433 0.348 
Year (2013) 177,735 0.165 
Constant -4,715,643 0.000** 
Number of observations 25,542 
Adjusted ܴଶ 0.122 
Note: * and ** correspondingly denote statistical significance at the 5% 
and 1% levels.  
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Multiple regression estimates the effects of other covariates on the performance 
indicator as well. The relationship between value added in the supported year and 
the value added increase after two years is negative and statistically significant. 
That is, the incremental growth diminishes as the value added of the company 
increases. 
OLS analyses (Table 4) are repetitively conducted with two-year increments 
( 2t ) of the ten performance indicators as dependent variables. Table 5 extracts 
the coefficient estimates and significance of the government R&D support 
treatment variable to summarize the OLS results. Table 5 compares the estimation 
that integrates the difference-in-differences, the matching method and the OLS 
regression with only the DID OLS regression and DID matching estimation 
methods. Compared to the other outcomes, the two-stage integrated analysis 
(DID+Matching+OLS) demonstrates a statistically significant causal effect on 
most performance indicators, except for the value added increment. 
In sum, government R&D support has contributed significantly to debt and 
equity financing of SMEs. Utilizing such funds, firms expanded their investments 
in intellectual property, relational assets, tangible assets and human capital. The 
recipients of government support achieved an approximate 5%p increase in debt 
financing and an increase of over 300 million won in equity financing due to their 
advantageous position in acquiring the government’s technology guarantees and 
fund of funds.9 Among the indicators of capabilities/assets, R&D investment and 
IP rights registrations have consistently shown considerable gains of 100%p and 
30%p, respectively, while marketing investment, deemed to be strongly 
complementary with regard to intellectual property, gained over 20%p. Tangible 
assets and human capital posted small but significant gains in investment growth. 
However, while R&D support has served successfully as a catalyst for private-
sector investment, it has not enhanced the operating performances of the recipients. 
Most have failed to see improvements in their value added compared to their non-
recipient counterparts, even recording significant negative growth in sales and 
operating profit.10 
Table 6 summarizes the treatment effect according to the amount of support. 
This table shows that the negative effects on value added, operating profit and sales 
 
9SMEs are significantly influenced by the government’s fund of funds, while large and mid-range firms that 
rely on the public stock market are less influenced by whether or not they receive government support. 
10The analysis of the increments after three years reveals similar results. Two- or three-year performance 
tracking after the completion of R&D may appear to be too short to evaluate the economic effects, but according 
to the 2016 Survey on Technology of SMEs (2017), SMEs reported that it took an average of 10.4 months from 
technology development to commercialization (5.4 months for development → 5.0 months for commercialization) 
and an additional 7.9 months to establish sales channels. Most R&D support programs for SMEs are more akin to 
short-term projects that are focused on improving competitiveness in existing products, and thus enough time is 
given to evaluate the performance of the support program. In the empirical analysis of the US SBIR program by 
Edison (2010), a significant increase in sales was observed starting one year after the support. This study intended 
to check whether the additional government support could improve recipients’ economic performances 
significantly compared to those of non-recipients whose investment amounts for all capabilities including R&D 
were similar to those of their counterparts. In particular, value added embraces input indicators such as R&D 
investment, meaning that an increase in this metric would exceed the average if the operating profit does not 
shrink to offset the increase in inputs. Furthermore, when the evaluation targets longer periods, the effects from the 
respective support methods tend to dissipate due to the growing impact from other noise sources. Oh and Kim 
(2017) confirmed waning or stagnating effects in all indicators, except for the debt increase rate, beyond three 
years after the support was provided. 
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TABLE ―5 SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF THE TREATMENT EFFECT ON THE INCREMENT OF 
TEN PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AMONG SMES IN THE MATCHED DATASET 
(Unit: 1,000 won; log transformation) 
Dependent variables 
(∆௧ାଶ) 
DID+OLS DID+Matching DID+Matching+OLS 
Benefit Significance Benefit Significance Benefit Significance 
Value added -106,153 0.258 -196,123 0.039* 38,159 0.672 
Operating profit -119,247 0.000** -70,437 0.069 -109,879 0.001** 
ln (sales) -0.069 0.000** 0.015 0.253 -0.045 0.000** 
ln (debt) -0.013 0.170 0.050 0.000** 0.047 0.000** 
Equity financing 212,583 0.004** 86,742 0.509 344,495 0.008** 
ln (R&D investment) 1.002 0.000** 0.870 0.000** 1.140 0.000** 
ln (IP rights registrations) 0.294 0.000** 0.289 0.000** 0.289 0.000** 
ln (human capital) 0.004 0.783 0.019 0.091 0.024 0.026* 
ln (tangible assets) -0.085 0.000** 0.059 0.000** 0.048 0.000** 
ln (marketing investment) 0.215 0.000** 0.212 0.000** 0.239 0.000** 
Note: * and ** correspondingly denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels. 
  
TABLE 6—OLS ANALYSIS COMPARISON OF TREATMENT EFFECTS BY FUND SIZE: MATCHED SMES 
(Unit: 1,000 won; log transformation) 
Dependent variables
(∆௧ାଶ) 
0-100 million won 100-200 million 200-500 million 500-million  Adj. 
ܴଶ Estimate Signif. Estimate Signif. Estimate Signif. Estimate Signif.  
Value added 168,283 0.323 72,059 0.598 180,450 0.152 -324,564 0.033*  0.122 
Operating profit -13,125 0.835 -56,782 0.260 -35,028 0.451 -367,146 0.000**  0.275 
ln (sales) -0.057 0.004** -0.024 0.135 -0.023 0.111 -0.098 0.000**  0.346 
ln (debt) 0.039 0.003** 0.046 0.000** 0.048 0.000** 0.052 0.000**  0.166 
Equity financing 197,290 0.421 271,809 0.166 358,833 0.048* 526,427 0.016*  0.043 
ln (R&D investment) 0.826 0.000** 1.241 0.000** 1.237 0.000** 1.099 0.000**  0.220 
ln (IP rights 
registrations) 0.209 0.000** 0.235 0.000** 0.278 0.000** 0.437 0.000**  0.331 
ln (human capital) -0.061 0.003** 0.022 0.174 0.038 0.010* 0.068 0.000**  0.130 
ln (tangible assets) 0.071 0.004** 0.043 0.031* 0.047 0.010* 0.038 0.089  0.137 
ln (marketing 
investment) 0.184 0.016* 0.322 0.000** 0.146 0.009** 0.319 0.000**  0.158 
Note: * and ** correspondingly denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels. 
 
are substantial and statistically significant when the support amount exceeds 500 
million won. The positive effect on debt is statistically significant for all sizes and 
increasing moderately along with the size of support. The positive effect on equity 
financing is statistically significant only when the support amount exceeds 200 
million won. The positive effect on R&D investment is the largest in the 100-500 
million won range, and the positive effect on IP rights registrations and human 
capital investment is the largest when support exceeds 500 million won. 
 
V. Exploratory Models to Improve the Selection of Recipients 
  
Because firms that receive government support tend to have superior capabilities 
to non-recipient firms, causal effects must be cautiously estimated to avoid 
overestimation from a simple comparison between recipients and non-recipients. 
However, contrary to expectations, Table 2 revealed lower growth rates of recipient 
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firms, and an ensuing estimation of the causal effects in Table 4-6 demonstrated 
that they were not due to negative treatment effects in most cases. Consequently, 
we can suspect that government support tends to be distributed to firms with low-
growth potential rather than to firms with high-growth potential. To verify our 
suspicion, a prediction model of the value added increment after two years is 
tested. 
A decision-tree algorithm builds a tree top-down from a root node and partitions 
the data into subsets that contain similar values through a reduction of the Gini 
index or variance. As the nodes and layers of a decision tree increase, the predictive 
power of the algorithm improves but its visualization becomes more difficult. To 
optimize the trade-offs when presenting results, we limit the number of final nodes 
to less than ten. Figure 2 shows the population split into six subgroups (nodes) after 
applying a decision-tree model known as the „causal conditional inference trees 
algorithm‟ to the value added increment after two years using our 17 covariates. 
According to the figure, firms with three or more IP rights registrations per year 
(node 11) account for a mere 1% of all firms but 11% of the recipients. It is 
probable that they were selected based on technology competence indicators, but 
their value added exhibits the largest decrement of -8.7 billion won. On the other 
 
 
 
Number of firms 
Final Node 
Total 
3 4 8 9 10 11 
Non-recipients 
7,150 
(1.8%) 
3,253 
(0.8%) 
113,580 
(29.2%) 
253,914 
(65.3%) 
7,661 
(2.0%) 
2,996 
(0.8%) 
388,554 
(100%) 
Recipients 
626 
(4.2%) 
776 
(5.3%) 
3,990 
(27.1%) 
7,454 
(50.5%) 
294 
(2.0%) 
1,604 
(10.9%) 
14,744 
(100%) 
Total 
7,776 
(1.9%) 
4,029 
(1.0%) 
117,570 
(29.2%) 
261,368 
(64.8%) 
7,958 
(2.0%) 
4,600 
(1.1%) 
403,301 
(100%) 
 
FIGURE 2. DECISION-TREE MODEL THAT PREDICTS THE VALUE ADDED INCREMENT (∆𝑡+2)  
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hand, small firms (node 9) with two or fewer IP rights registrations per year 
account for two thirds of all firms but only half of the recipients despite the fact 
that their value added increment is large at 100 million won on average. In other 
words, firms with high growth prospects were the majority but a smaller proportion 
were selected as recipients, while those with low growth prospects were in the 
minority but a larger proportion were recipients. Consequently, the value added 
growth of the recipients is lower than average. 
Even if the average causal effect of a policy on the entire population is 
statistically significant, some subgroups may be affected either insignificantly or in 
the opposite direction. On the other hand, policies with insignificant average 
effects on the population may affect some subgroups either positively or negatively 
to a statistically significant level. 
Athey et al. (2016) develop a causalTree algorithm that adopts a random-forest 
prediction algorithm to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. Random-forest 
algorithms allow for the flexible modeling of high-dimensional interactions by 
building a large number of decision trees from randomly extracted bootstrap 
samples and averaging their predictions. Wager and Athey (2017) require the 
individual trees to satisfy a fairly strong condition, which they call honesty: a tree 
is honest if, for each training example i , it only uses the response iY  to estimate 
the within-node treatment effect or to decide where to place the splits, but not both. 
When placing splits, an honest tree approach ignores the outcome data iY  and 
instead trains a classification tree for the treatment assignments. Such “propensity 
trees” are particularly useful in observational studies because selection bias due to 
variations in ( )e x  can be minimized. This approach, which matches training 
examples based on the estimated propensity, is similar to propensity score 
matching. Although a randomized experiment is ideal, heterogeneous treatment 
effects for subgroups can be estimated from observational data if matched samples 
from the control group are very similar to those in the treatment group (Prust and 
Prasad, 2015). 
Subgroups are derived using performance indicators and the 17 covariates and 
are sorted in descending order of the low treatment effects and aggregated into 
decimal groups. Table 7 shows the average causal effect on the value added 
increment for each decimal group. It compares the causal effect and observed 
difference for each decile group and indicates the portion of the beneficiary 
companies in each group, along with the average firm attribute values (across the 
17 covariates) of both the experimental and control groups that belong to each 
decimal subgroup. 
Figure 3 shows that deciles 1-4 are positive and deciles 5-10 are negative. These 
results imply that government support had an insignificant impact on the value 
added increment of the entire population, not because there was no positive impact 
at all but because the significant positive effect experienced by numerous recipients 
was offset by the negative impact experienced by the majority. The bottom decile 
10 in particular shows the largest negative effect, with most firms having high 
value added and high equity levels, numerous IP rights registrations, long histories 
and high proportions of IPOs at the time of the support. 
The model that estimates heterogeneous treatment effects can predict the subgroup 
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TABLE 7— COMPARISON OF THE CAUSAL EFFECT ON VALUE ADDED INCREMENT (∆𝑡+2) FOR EACH 
DECIMAL SUBGROUP OF THE MATCHED SMES 
(Unit: 1,000 won; log transformation) 
Characteristics 
Decile 
Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Observations 2,760 2,587 2,584 2,497 2,488 2,525 2,548 2,507 2,656 2,425 25,577 
Causal effect 319 91 39 6 -21 -48 -82 -136 -298 -1,690 -171 
Observed difference -47 313 199 179 140 152 229 256 279 -317 140 
Portion of recipients 0.504 0.508 0.467 0.481 0.493 0.506 0.492 0.476 0.497 0.655 0.507 
Value added 5,994 2,442 1,778 1,552 1,476 1,671 1,898 2,517 4,835 7,280 3,162 
Sales 16.699 15.527 15.154 14.935 14.824 14.901 15.126 15.349 16.238 16.469 15.534 
Operating profit 1,727 608 404 352 326 360 419 581 1,132 998 701 
Equity financing 10,773 3,987 2,720 2,249 2,141 2,344 2,790 3,783 8,241 30,224 6,870 
Debt 15.922 14.791 14.420 14.246 14.127 14.250 14.485 14.789 15.633 16.469 14.920 
Tangible assets 15.134 13.661 13.223 13.001 12.911 13.126 13.539 13.885 14.948 15.817 13.933 
Human capital 14.555 13.570 13.298 13.172 13.127 13.247 13.440 13.633 14.324 14.724 13.716 
Marketing investment 10.009 8.042 7.452 6.854 6.497 6.568 6.782 7.338 8.697 9.796 7.823 
R&D investment 12.212 10.883 10.914 10.809 10.904 11.211 11.213 11.379 11.627 11.722 11.295 
IP rights registrations 0.701 0.508 0.463 0.435 0.423 0.396 0.453 0.466 0.588 0.890 0.533 
Firm age 13.641 10.153 8.997 8.917 8.846 9.047 9.631 10.435 12.944 15.670 10.844 
Firm size 1.756 1.375 1.245 1.198 1.178 1.189 1.237 1.336 1.589 1.733 1.387 
Ratio of venture firms 0.559 0.595 0.615 0.633 0.637 0.633 0.603 0.594 0.553 0.477 0.590 
IPO ratio 0.782 0.372 0.246 0.188 0.169 0.198 0.246 0.373 0.666 0.842 0.411 
Ratio of affiliate firms 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.001 
Firm region 1.927 2.234 2.184 2.035 2.065 2.025 2.057 1.990 2.351 2.139 2.101 
Industry group 1.993 1.928 1.940 1.983 1.982 2.013 1.987 1.977 2.022 2.151 1.997 
  
 
FIGURE 3. COMPARISON OF TREATMENT EFFECTS BY DECILE: 
VALUE ADDED INCREMENT IN MATCHED SMES 
 
into which each firm will fall. Accordingly, if government support assigned for 
recipients in the bottom six deciles (that are expected to exhibit negative effects) is 
redistributed to non-recipients in the top four deciles (that are expected to exhibit 
the opposite), positive treatment effects would expand two fold or more. 
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Although we introduced the prediction model and the heterogeneous causal 
effect model only for the value added increment in this article, we can also do this 
for the nine other performance indicators as well. Depending on the future 
application, one can select a few of the performance indicators or allocate 
appropriate weights to set up a customized model for analysis. 
If the aforementioned models that predict the growth potential and heterogeneous 
causal effect are elaborated further in subsequent studies, it would be possible to 
select recipient firms with more growth potential and better treatment effects, 
which will in turn help to accelerate their growth. There exist sufficient records of 
support for medium-sized firms with which one can accurately predict their growth 
prospects and treatment effects. However, this is not the case for small firms with 
little experience in R&D and IP rights registrations, which means that there is not 
enough data, as of yet, to develop a predictive model to produce accurate estimates 
of policy effects in these cases. Therefore, this study suggests that experiments to 
expand support to smaller firms should be undertaken to explore the corresponding 
causal effects. 
 
VI. Conclusion and Policy Suggestions 
 
When consumer needs are ambiguous or change rapidly, the sequential 
completion of R&D is likely to result in a waste of time and money. Rather, the 
agile development method may be more effective, as it enables the early release of 
prototypes to potential customers so that firms receive feedback and make prompt 
changes. In other words, shortening the ‘time to the market’ has become 
imperative, and such an environment offers more opportunities to SMEs and 
startups whose business strengths are in speed and flexibility. To keep pace with 
the rapid evolution of today’s business R&D climate, government R&D support 
programs must be upgraded with more flexible operating systems in which active 
exchanges of feedback take place between those involved in R&D experiments and 
market verification. 
First, with respect to recipient selection, a predictive model should be developed 
and utilized in phases while shifting away from the existing selection model, which 
is heavily dependent on qualitative evaluations by technology experts. As of 2016, 
22 special agencies for R&D management in Korea spent more than two trillion 
won on operating costs, which exceeds 10% of the national R&D budget.11 
Government R&D support programs for the private sector have incurred massive 
administrative costs on ex-ante, mid-term and ex-post evaluations, but recipients 
have exhibited slower growth than non-recipients. Howell (2017) found that even 
US programs saw no correlation between proposal review scores and corporate 
growth rates. Owing to the large uncertainties in the initial stages of research, even 
experts are unable to predict success more accurately than prediction models. 
Hence, it is cost-efficient to let prediction models select which firm should receive 
 
11The Hankyoreh, “Government R&D Budget Wasted on Management Expenses, Instead of Researchers,” 
Oct. 7th, 2016 (in Korean). 
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a small amount of research funding. 12  More policy experiments should be 
attempted to provide small grants to small firms, which have often been neglected 
in the recipient selection process. The government will be able to become a 
supporter rather than a manager by delegating the selection process to an 
algorithm. Only then can it focus on providing the necessary advice that can help 
inexperienced recipients conduct research in a more systematic manner. After the 
recipient firm completes the research, experts can judge the research output 
qualitatively and decide whether to provide follow-up funding instead of relying on 
the prediction model. However, it is not necessary to extend government support if 
the research result and commerciality are both excellent and hence the firm is 
likely to receive private financial support. Additional government support will be 
welcome only if the research result is satisfactory but its commercial viability 
remains ambiguous at that point. 
Secondly, evaluations should be focused on broader economic performance 
outcomes and not only on publications, IP rights and amounts of R&D investment. 
Accordingly, a selection model should be developed to optimize the evaluation 
results. The aforementioned evidence shows that firms with three or more patents 
registered per year exhibit negative growth on average. The government must now 
discard the old belief that more patents automatically lead to greater corporate 
growth. The Korean government already has integrated data on ministerial R&D 
projects, which could be used to formulate evidence-based policies. However, 
insufficient action has been taken thus far with regard to policy planning, 
implementations and evaluations in relation to market and financial data. Attempts 
to realize such policy formulations should be initiated by those in ministries 
working for industrial innovation, with the goal of driving the fourth industrial 
revolution. 
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